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BIOPOLITICS AND SOVEREIGNTY: 
TOWARD THE QUESTION OF 
THE LIMITS OF JURIDICAL RATIONALITY
This text has a minimal stake; its logic is constructed around three critical 
points. First, to problematize the key preconditions on which the juridical the-
ory of sovereignty rests. Second, to analyze the central elements that constitute 
biopolitics as a type of power functioning parallel with disciplinary practices. 
And third, to make a sociological attempt to delineate the limits of validity of 
juridical rationality in contemporary societies by examining the relationship 
between biopolitics and sovereignty.
First, which are the key preconditions on which the juridical model of sov-
ereignty rests and functions? We must start by noting that there is a general con-
dition of possibility: the social contract. Classic juridical theory views power 
as a right which can be possessed in the way one possesses a commodity, and 
which can therefore be transferred or alienated. Of course, this is done through 
a juridical act or an act that founds a right based on a contract. Power is the con-
crete, ‘empirical’ power that any individual can possess, and which he or she 
can surrender, either wholly or partly, so as to constitute a political sovereignty. 
The constitution of political power is modeled on a juridical operation similar to 
the ‘delegation of rights’. There is an obvious, and constitutive for juridical ra-
tionality, analogy between power and commodities, between power and wealth. 
That is why we have a political power which fi nds its formal model in the proc-
ess of constant exchange, in the economy of the circulation of goods. This is a 
system which is articulated around power as a primal right that is surrendered, 
and which constitutes sovereignty, with the contract as the matrix of political 
power. When the thus constituted power transgresses itself, that is to say, when 
it oversteps the limits of the social contract, it can become nothing but oppres-
sion. Contractual power and actual oppression as the limit or the transgression 
of the limit. Juridical rationality is built around the contract-oppression schema, 
in which the pertinent opposition is that between the legitimate and the illegiti-
mate in the exercise of power, which is and can be solely a right.
Second, there is no doubt that from the Middle Ages onward, the essen-
tial role of the theory of right has been to establish the legitimacy of power: 
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the major problem around which the entire theory of right is organized is the 
problem of sovereignty. To say that the problem of sovereignty is the central 
problem of law in modern societies practically means that the essential function 
of the legal discourse is to mask or eliminate the fact of domination within the 
system of power. At that, in order to replace that entirely covert but real domi-
nation with two juridical elements: the legitimate rights of the sovereignty on 
the one hand, and the legal obligation to obey on the other. Ultimately, the legal 
system is an elimination of the social fact of domination and its non-juridical 
consequences in the exercise of power. In reality, however, law is a key instru-
ment of domination: it activates and implements relations that are not relations 
of sovereignty, but relations of domination. Hence, we are not speaking of the 
signifi cant fact of the global domination of one over the others or of one group 
over another, but of the multiple forms of domination that can be exercised in 
society: so not sovereignty in its one edifi ce, but the multiple subjugations that 
take place and function within the social body. In fact, the legal system and the 
juridical fi eld are permanent vehicles for relations of domination and, as Michel 
Foucault (2003, p.27) puts it, for ‘polymorphous techniques of subjugation’. In 
this perspective, law must be viewed not in terms of a legitimacy that has to be 
established, but in terms of the procedures of subjugation it implements. What 
is important here is to get around this central problem of sovereignty and the 
obedience of individuals, and to reveal instead the problem of domination and 
subjugation. We should not orient our analysis of power toward the juridical 
system of sovereignty, state apparatuses, grand ideologies, but toward domina-
tion, forms of subjugation, practical dominations. This means studying power 
relations outside the fi eld delineated by juridical sovereignty and analyzing 
them on the basis of the techniques of domination.
Third, at the same time there is an irrevocable historical fact: the juridical 
theory of sovereignty which dates from the Middle Ages and from the reactiva-
tion of Roman law; it is constituted around the problem of the monarch and the 
monarchy. As Michel Foucault notes, in historical terms the juridical theory of 
sovereignty played four important roles. First, it referred to an actual power 
mechanism, that of the feudal monarchy. Next, it was used as an instrument 
to constitute and justify the great administrative monarchies. Then from the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward, the juridical theory of sovereignty 
became a weapon that was in circulation on both sides, and it was used both 
to restrict and to strengthen royal power; it was the main instrument of the po-
litical and theoretical struggles that took place around power systems in those 
two centuries. Finally, in the eighteenth century we fi nd the juridical theory of 
sovereignty playing a fourth role; at this point in time, its role was to construct 
an alternative model in contrast to administrative, authoritarian or absolute 
monarchies: the model of parliamentary democracies. If we trace these four 
roles historically, we will fi nd that as long as feudal-type societies survived, the 
problems dealt with by the juridical theory of sovereignty were actually coex-
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tensive with the general mechanics of power, or the way power was exercised 
from the highest to the lowest levels. In other words, the relationship of sov-
ereignty, understood in both the broad and the narrow sense of the notion, was 
actually coextensive with the entire social body. And the way in which power 
was exercised could indeed be articulated in terms of the juridical relationship 
between sovereign and subject.
Fourth, an important phenomenon emerged gradually in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries: the appearance of a new mechanism of power which 
had very specifi c procedures, completely new instruments, and very different 
equipment, and which was incompatible with relations of sovereignty. This new 
mechanism of power applies to bodies and what they do, and not to the land and 
what it produces. It was a mechanism of power that made it possible to extract 
time and labour rather than commodities and wealth. It was a type of power that 
was exercised through constant surveillance and not in discontinuous fashion 
through a chronic system of obligations. It presupposed a closely meshed grid 
of material coercions rather than the physical existence of a sovereign. And it 
therefore defi ned a new structure of power based upon the principle that there 
had to be an increase both in the subjugated forces and in the force and effi cacy 
of that which subjugated them. This type of power, then, is the exact, point-for-
point opposite of the power mechanics that the juridical theory of sovereignty 
describes and explains. For this theory is bound up with a form of power that is 
exercised much more over the land and the produce of the land than over bod-
ies and what they do. This theory concerns power’s appropriation not of time 
and labour, but of goods and wealth. This makes it possible to transcribe, into 
juridical terms, discontinuous and chronic obligations, but not to code continu-
ous surveillance; it is a theory that makes it possible to found power around 
and on the basis of the physical existence of the sovereign, but not permanent 
systems of surveillance. The juridical theory of sovereignty is that central ele-
ment which can found absolute power on the absolute expenditure of power, 
but which cannot calculate power with minimum expenditure and maximum 
effi ciency. This new type of power, which can therefore no longer be articulated 
in terms of sovereignty, is, according to Michel Foucault, one of bourgeois 
society’s great inventions. It was one of the basic tools for the establishment 
of industrial capitalism and the corresponding type of social organization. Of 
course, this non-sovereign power, which is absolutely foreign to the form of 
sovereignty and subjugation, is disciplinary power. This power cannot be de-
scribed or justifi ed in terms of the juridical theory of sovereignty, it is radically 
heterogeneous and, according to the rules of history and society, it should have 
led to the disappearance of the juridical theory of sovereignty itself.
Fifth, the pertinent sociological question here is: why has the theory of 
sovereignty not only continued to exist as an ideology of modern law in the last 
two hundred centuries, but has also continued to organize the juridical codes 
created in Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries? Why has the theory 
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of sovereignty lived on precisely as an ideology of modern law and as the or-
ganizing principle behind and in the juridical codes of, ultimately, all contem-
porary (constitutional) legislation? There are at least two reasons for that. On 
the one hand, the theory of sovereignty was, in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, a permanent instrument of critique against the monarchy and against 
all the obstacles that stood in the way of the development of disciplinary prac-
tices. Yet on the other hand, this theory, and the organization of a juridical code 
centred upon it, made it possible to superimpose on the mechanisms of disci-
pline a legal system that concealed its techniques of domination and guaranteed 
that everyone could exercise their sovereign rights thanks to the sovereignty of 
the State. In other words, juridical systems, be they theories or codes, allowed 
the democratization of sovereignty and the establishment of modern law ar-
ticulated with collective sovereignty, at the very time when, to the extent that, 
and because the democratization of sovereignty proved to be heavily burdened 
by the mechanisms of disciplinary coercion. It must be noted that once disci-
plinary constraints had to both function as mechanisms of domination and be 
concealed to the extent that they were the mode in which power was actually 
exercised, the theory of sovereignty indeed had to fi nd expression in the juridi-
cal apparatus and had to be reactivated by judicial codes.
Thus, from the nineteenth century onward we have a codifi ed legislation, a 
public discourse and institutional organization of modern law articulated around 
the principle of the sovereignty of the social body and the delegation of indi-
vidual sovereignty to the State; at the same time, however, we also have a tight 
grid of disciplinary coercions that guarantees the cohesion of that social body. 
But that grid cannot in any way be transcribed in law, even though the two nec-
essarily go together. ‘A right of sovereignty and a mechanics of discipline,’ says 
Michel Foucault (2003, p.37): it is between those two limits that power is actu-
ally exercised. These two limits are, however, so exact and so heterogeneous 
that we can never reduce one to the other. In modern societies, power is exer-
cised through, on the basis of, and in the very play of the heterogeneity between 
a public right of sovereignty and a polymorphous mechanics of discipline. But 
according to Foucault (ibid., p.38), this is not to say that we have, ‘on the one 
hand, a garrulous and explicit system of right as is the system of sovereignty, 
and on the other hand, silent disciplines that operate down below and constitute 
the mechanics of power’. As we know, disciplines have their own discourse 
that cannot be and is not a juridical discourse. The discourse of disciplines is 
alien to the discourse of law; it is alien in principle to the discourse of rules as 
a legitimate result of the will of the sovereign. ‘The discourse of disciplines is 
about a rule: not a juridical rule derived from sovereignty, but a discourse about 
a natural rule, or in other words a norm’, says Foucault (ibid.). Sovereignty and 
discipline, the right of sovereignty and disciplinary practices are in fact the two 
things that constitute the mechanisms of power in modern societies.
At the same time, however, it must be noted that the juridical model of 
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sovereignty is unable to provide a concrete analysis of the practical multiplicity 
of power relations. First, because the theory of sovereignty necessarily tries to 
constitute what may be called a closed cycle, a subject-to-subject cycle, and to 
show how a subject – understood as meaning an individual who is endowed by 
nature with rights and capabilities – can and must become a subject, this time in 
the sense of an element that is subjectifi ed in a power relationship. Sovereignty 
is the theory that of necessity goes from subject to subject, that establishes the 
political relationship between two subjects. Thus, the cycle is in fact a closed 
system: it begins and ends with the juridical subject.
Second, the theory of sovereignty assumes from the outset the existence of 
a multiplicity of powers that are not powers in the political sense of the term; 
they are capacities, possibilities, and potentials. And it can constitute them as 
political powers only if it has in the meantime established a moment of funda-
mental and foundational unity between possibilities and powers – namely, the 
unity of power. It is irrelevant whether this unity of power will take on the face 
of the Monarch or the form of the State; the various institutions of power will 
be derived precisely from this unitary power. The multiplicity of powers, in the 
sense of political powers, can be established and can function only on the basis 
of the unity of power constructed by the theory of sovereignty.
Third, the theory of sovereignty shows how a power can be constituted not 
exactly in accordance with the law, but in accordance with a certain basic legiti-
macy that is more basic than any law, that is something like a universal law of 
all laws, and that allows the different laws to function as such. In other words, 
the theory of sovereignty is the subject-to-subject cycle, the cycle of power and 
powers, the cycle of legitimacy and law. It implicitly presupposes a constituted 
subject and a relationship to the subject; it strives to establish the essential unity 
of power and it is always deployed within the pre-existing element of the law. It 
therefore assumes, as Michel Foucault shows, the existence of three ‘primitive’ 
elements: a subject who has to be subjectifi ed; the unity of power that has to be 
founded; and the legitimacy that has to be respected. Subject, unity, and law: 
it is among these elements that the juridical theory of sovereignty comes into 
play, and it both takes them as given and founds them in the social body.
However, these three prerequisites constituted by the theory of sovereignty 
– of subject, unity, and law – substitute the actual relations of domination. That
is why we should change the point of view and, rather than starting with the
subject (or subjects) and the elements of the subject that are a condition of pos-
sibility of the relationship of sovereignty, begin with the actual power relation-
ship itself, and see how that relationship itself determines the elements to which
it is applied. We should not be asking subjects how, why, and by what right they
agree to being subjugated, but showing how actual relations of subjugation
manufacture subjects. We should be analyzing the relations of domination in
their multiplicity, in their differences, their specifi city, and their reversibility;
we should not be looking for a sort of sovereignty that is the source of all pow-
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ers, but showing how the various relations of domination support one another, 
relate to one other, at how they reinforce one another, converging or negating 
and striving to annul one another. Studying the actual relations of domination 
rather than the source of sovereignty means that we should not try to examine 
them in terms of their basic legitimacy; we should try to identify the technical 
instruments that allow them to exist. In short, rather than accepting the three 
prerequisites of law, unity, and subject – which make sovereignty the source 
of power and the basis of institutions – we should adopt the threefold point of 
view of the techniques of domination, their heterogeneity, and their effects that 
make them the basis of power relations; that is to say, we should analyze the 
manufacture of subjects rather than the genesis of the sovereign.
Now let us change the perspective and problematize the juridical theory 
of sovereignty through the lens not of disciplinary practice but of biopolitical 
technology. As we know, Michel Foucault defi nes sovereign power above all 
in terms of the right to decide life and death. In the Classical Age, however, 
this sovereign right existed in a considerably diminished form: it could not be 
exercised by the sovereign over his subjects in an absolute and unconditional 
way, but only in cases where the sovereign’s very existence was in jeopardy. 
Understood in this way, the right to decide life and death was not an absolute 
privilege: it was conditioned by the defence of the sovereign, and his own life. 
Notwithstanding the historical differences, the sovereign right over life and 
death – both in this relative and limited form, and its ancient and absolute form 
– is a dissymmetrical right. The sovereign exercised his right over life only by
exercising his right to kill, or by refraining from killing; he demonstrated his
sovereign power over life only through the death he was capable of causing.
The right which was formulated as the ‘power over life and death’ was in reality
the right to take life or let live.
Hence, the right over life and death is a basic attribute in the classical ju-
ridical theory of sovereignty. But the right over life and death is a strange right, 
even at the theoretical level; indeed, what does having the right over life and 
death actually mean? In one sense, to say that the sovereign has a right over life 
and death means that he can, basically, either have people put to death or let 
them live, or in any case that life and death are not natural or immediate phe-
nomena which are primal or radical, and which fall outside the fi eld of political 
power. If we take the argument to the point where it becomes paradoxical, it 
means that in terms of his or her relationship with the sovereign, the subject is, 
by rights, neither dead nor alive. From the point of view of life and death, the 
subject is neutral, and it is thanks to the sovereign that the subject has the right 
to be alive or, possibly, the right to be dead. In any case, one fact is absolutely 
certain: the lives and deaths of subjects become rights only as a result of the 
will of the sovereign. That is the theoretical paradox that must have as its corol-
lary a sort of practical disequilibrium. What does the right over life and death 
actually mean? Obviously not that the sovereign can grant life in the same way 
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that he can infl ict death. The right over life and death is always exercised in an 
unbalanced way and the balance is always tipped in favour of death. Sovereign 
power’s effect on life is exercised only when the sovereign can kill. The very 
essence of the right over life and death is actually the right to kill: it is at the 
moment when the sovereign can kill that he exercises his right over life. Thus, 
there is no real symmetry in the right over life and death. It is not the right to put 
people to death or to grant them life. Nor is it the right to allow people to live 
or to leave them to die. It is the right to take life or let live. And this introduces 
an obvious dissymmetry between life and death.
Michel Foucault shows that one of the greatest transformations political 
law underwent in the nineteenth century was that this ancient sovereign right – 
to take life or let live – was, if not exactly replaced, then at least complemented 
by a new law which does not erase the old right but which does penetrate it, 
permeate it, modify it, being precisely the opposite right or, rather, power: the 
power to make live and let die. The right of sovereignty was, then, the right 
to take life or let live. But this new law which was established is the right to 
make live and to let die. Of course, this transformation did not occur all at 
once, but gradually and with efforts; juridical rationality logically reached an 
epistemological threshold that we can trace historically in the theory of law. 
In it this question about the right of life and death was already being asked 
in the seventeenth and especially in the eighteenth century. The jurists now 
ask: when an agreement is concluded at the level of the social contract, that is, 
when individuals come together to constitute a sovereign, to delegate absolute 
power over them to a sovereign, why do they do that? The answer: they do it 
because they are forced to by some threat or by need. They therefore constitute 
a sovereign in order to live. To the extent that this is the case, can life actually 
become one of the rights of the sovereign? Isn’t life the foundation of the sover-
eign’s right, and can the sovereign actually demand that his subjects grant him 
the right to exercise the power of life and death over them, or in other words, 
simply the power to kill them? Mustn’t life remain outside the social contract 
to the extent that it was the fi rst, initial, and foundational reason for the contract 
itself? All this is a debate within political philosophy that demonstrates how the 
problem of life began to be problematized in the fi eld of political thought and 
of the analysis of political power.
Thus, since the Classical Age there has been a gradual reversal of the ef-
fect of the mechanisms of power: it is from that moment on that there has been 
a gradual shift in the right over death or at least a tendency to align itself with 
the exigencies of a life-governing power. Death, which in the Classical Age 
was based on the right of the sovereign to defend himself or to demand that he 
be defended, is now manifested as the reverse of the right of modern society to 
ensure, maintain, or develop its life. As a result of that, power over death now 
presents itself as a corollary to a new power that is positively exercised over 
life that governs life by subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive 
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regulations.
The history of penal systems in the world in the last two and a half centu-
ries attests to the accelerated development of this social process. Can we ex-
plain the abolition of the death penalty in most ‘civilized’ countries not as an 
effect of new philosophical refl ections, political theories or juridical doctrines, 
but solely as the result of the transformations in the power technologies? Why 
did the death penalty become more and more diffi cult to apply and require 
ever more scientifi c and civic arguments once power gave itself the function 
of governing life? How is it possible for a power to be exercised, to become 
most visible, when it infl icts death, if its main role is to ensure life by main-
taining order in it? Obviously for such a power, the death penalty has now be-
come socially impossible, as every time you sentence someone to death means 
causing a public scandal; the death penalty is now ‘beyond’ the lawful right 
to punish, it is both its limit and its contradiction. Hence the fact, sometimes 
so diffi cult to understand, that in the second half of the twentieth century life 
imprisonment became the only possible penal alternative; with this important 
substitution even juridical rationality has shown that it is addressed at the life, 
not at the death, of the criminal. As for the preservation of the death penalty 
in a number of ‘progressive’ countries, this has happened only by a shift in the 
legal argumentations. This change is signifi cant because jurists are ever more 
often invoking as proof of guilt not the enormity of the crime itself but the po-
tential danger of the criminal, the possibility of a repeat offence, and the need 
to safeguard society.
The more general process that is manifested by the abolition of the death 
penalty is that of the gradual disqualifi cation of death, which anthropologists 
and historians discuss so often. Everyone knows that the great public ritualiza-
tion of death has disappeared, or has at least been fading away, since the late 
eighteenth century. So much so that death – which has ceased to be one of 
those spectacular ceremonies in which individuals, the family, the group, and 
practically the whole of society took part – has become, in contrast, something 
to be hidden away; it has become the most private thing of all. The reason why 
death has become something to be hidden away is not that fear has somehow 
been displaced or that repression has been modifi ed; the reason lies in the trans-
formation of the mechanisms of power. What once (and until the end of the 
eighteenth century) made death so spectacular and ritualized it so much was 
the fact that it was a manifestation of a transition from one power to another 
power. Death was the moment when we made the transition from one power, 
that of the sovereign of this world, to another power – that of the sovereign of 
the next world. We went from one court of law to another, from a right over life 
and death, to a right to either eternal life or eternal damnation. Death also meant 
the transmission of the power of the dying, and that power was transmitted to 
those who survived him or her: last words, last recommendations, last wills and 
testaments.
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But now that power is decreasingly the power of the right to take life, and 
increasingly the right to intervene to make live as well as to infl uence the way 
and conditions of life, or once power begins to intervene mainly at this level 
in order to improve life by eliminating accidents, the random element, and de-
fi ciencies, death becomes, insofar as it is the end of life, the end, the limit of 
power. Death is outside the power relationship: death is beyond the reach of 
power, and power has a grip on it only in general, overall, or statistical terms. 
Power has no control over death, but it can control mortality. In this sense, it is 
only natural that death would gradually become one of the most private and in-
timate things of all. Whereas in the right of sovereignty, death was the moment 
of the most obvious manifestation of the absolute power of the sovereign, death 
now becomes, in contrast, the moment when the individual escapes all power, 
falls back on him- or herself and retreats into his or her own privacy. Power no 
longer has power over death; power is not interested in death.
‘One might say that the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by 
a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death’ (Foucault, 1978, p.138). 
Hence, the process of social disqualifi cation of death has as its starting point on 
the historical threshold of modernity the constant aspiration of the technologies 
of power to expel death from their fi eld of operation. This process is not linked 
in any way to some internal shift or overall transformation of social conscious-
ness of death, even less so to the emergence of some fundamental anxiety at 
the level of mass attitudes that would make death unbearable to contemporary 
societies. Since the new form of power seeks to establish its domination over 
life, throughout its unfolding, it is only natural that death should gradually be-
come the external limit of this power, and therefore the most private moment 
of human existence.
At this point I want to cite Emile Durkheim in order to prove that it was no 
coincidence that suicide became, in the course of the nineteenth century, one of 
the fi rst conducts to enter into the sphere of sociological analysis. As we know, 
before this historical period suicide was considered a crime, since it was a way 
to usurp the power of death which the sovereign alone had the right to exercise. 
From that moment on, it testifi ed to the individual and personal right to die, 
at the borders and in the interstices of power that was exercised over life. As 
Durkheim shows, suicide is both an evolutionary and a statistical phenomenon: 
the social facts that would be considered pathological in a society are those that 
diverge from the average type, marking past stages of a previous evolution or 
heralding coming phases of a future development.
If we designate as ‘average type’ that hypothetical being that is constructed 
by assembling in the same individual, the most frequent forms, one may 
say that the normal type merges with the average type, and that every de-
viation from this standard of health is a morbid phenomenon.  (Durkheim, 
1964, pp.55-56)
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And he complements this statistical point of view with an evolutionary 
perspective: ‘A social fact can, then, be called normal for a given social spe-
cies only in relation to a given phase of its development’ (ibid., 1964, p.57). 
Hence, suicide as a social fact has a dual mode of existence: a negative and a 
probable aspect. Negative, because suicide is defi ned in relation to a particular 
norm and because the whole essence of the pathological consists in the degree 
of deviation from this norm: suicide is marginal in nature and deviant vis-à-vis 
a culture to the extent that it is a form of behaviour that is not integrated into 
this culture. A probable aspect, because the social content of suicide is defi ned 
through the, in themselves, opposite possibilities that are manifested in it: this 
is the statistical probability of a gradual divergence from the average. Hence, 
in this functional sociological analysis suicide has a key place among the prob-
abilities that serve as an external limit of the cultural reality of a social group or 
of a type of society. The wish to die, so incomprehensible and yet so persistent 
and constant in its manifestations, and therefore almost impossible to explain 
as being due to individual peculiarities or particular circumstances, was one of 
the fi rst fi ssures in modern society in which political power had assigned itself 
the task of governing life.
To sum up: in the late eighteenth century, the second pole of the power over 
life was formed, a pole
focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life 
and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, births 
and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all 
the conditions that can cause these to vary. Their supervision was effected 
through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a bio-
politics of the population. (Foucault, 1978, p.139)
The concept ‘biopolitics’, then, refers to human life as integrated by the 
technologies of power whose mechanisms of knowledge are aimed at trans-
forming life. But this regulatory power is directed not at man-as-body – an ob-
ject and instrument of the normalizing practices of disciplines – but at the living 
man, at man-as-living-being, at man-as-species. What does this non-sovereign 
power actually involve, which are the key spheres of biopolitical intervention, 
which are the main instruments used by bio-power?
Above all, biopolitics aims at regulating the processes related to the way of 
reproduction of a population: the ratio of births to deaths, the rate of reproduc-
tion, the birth and mortality rates of this population. At the end of the eighteenth 
century it was these processes – the birth rate, the mortality rate, longevity, 
and so on – that became the fi rst objects of biopolitical knowledge and the fi rst 
targets of regulatory controls. It is no coincidence that it was in this period 
that such global phenomena began to be measured in statistical terms in the 
fi rst demographic surveys. On the other hand, there was already also constant 
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observation of the more or less spontaneous or coordinated techniques used by 
the population to control the birth rate; in a word, there was a power attempt to 
identify the phenomena of birth-control practices. This also marked the begin-
nings of a natalist policy, or in any case, a series of government schemes of 
intervening in global phenomena relating to the birth rate. But this regulation 
control also dealt with the problem of mortality, but in a new social dimension; 
not simply at the level of the epidemics, the threat of which had haunted politi-
cal powers ever since the early Middle Ages. What was at issue was not the epi-
demics that struck from the outside and subjugated a mass of people, but what 
Michel Foucault calls ‘endemics’, or in other words, the form, nature, exten-
sion, duration and intensity of the illnesses prevalent in a population. What was 
at issue was illness as phenomena affecting a population: ‘Death was no longer 
something that suddenly swooped down on life – as in an epidemic. Death was 
now something permanent, something that slips into life, perpetually gnaws at 
it, diminishes it and weakens it’ (Foucault, 2003, p.244). This led to the social 
reorganization of medicine. From now on the main function of medicine would 
be public hygiene: institutions would gradually be established to coordinate 
medical care, and public campaigns would be conducted to teach hygiene and 
to medicalise the population. So, biopolitics’ fi rst fi eld is regulatory interven-
tion in the problems of reproduction, the birth rate, and the mortality rate.
The second fi eld of biopolitical intervention can be defi ned as that of ‘life-
incapacity’. What is at issue here is a set of phenomena, some of which are 
universal and others accidental, but which, despite their different origins and 
causes, have similar effects in that they incapacitate individuals, put them out 
of the circuit or neutralize them with respect to the active way of life. From the 
early nineteenth century onwards, this would be primarily the very important 
problem of old age, of individuals who, because of their age, fall out of the fi eld 
of capacity, of activity, of labour. On the other hand, this fi eld of intervention 
would include also accidents, infi rmaries, and various anomalies. And it was in 
order to deal with those partially universal and partially accidental phenomena 
that the organization of biopolitics would establish not only social welfare in-
stitutions but also much more effi cient mechanisms of regulatory controls. This 
would also be simultaneous with the introduction of more rational mechanisms 
for social insurance and assistance, individual and collective savings, and over-
all safety and security of a population.
The third, and last, fi eld which biopolitics began to regulate in the late 
eighteenth century is the relations between human beings as a species, and 
hence as living beings, and the environment in which they live. This applies 
above all to the direct consequences and long-term effects of the geographi-
cal, climatic or hydrographic environment on the way of life. As well as to the 
problem of the environment to the extent that it is not a natural environment 
and to the extent that it has counter-effects on the population; this is an artifi cial 
environment created by the human race itself. This would be essentially, the 
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urban problem, that of urban planning, infrastructure and communications, but 
also the problems of the urban way of life, of the potential dangers in the urban 
environment, of the essence of and threats to urban people.
To sum up: it is from the problems of reproduction, of the birth rate, of the 
mortality rate, of the various biological disabilities and life incapacities, of the 
direct consequences and long-term effects of the environment that biopolitics 
would derive its knowledge and defi ne its power’s fi eld of intervention. But 
the said fi elds of biopolitical intervention were contingent on the emergence of 
several important preconditions which are in fact conditions of possibility of 
this regulatory control.
The fi rst one is the appearance of a radically new element which until this 
historical period was unknown both to the theory of sovereignty and to discipli-
nary practice. For whatever we may claim, the theory of sovereignty basically 
knows only the individual and society: the contracting individual and the social 
body constituted by the voluntary or implicit contract among autonomous citi-
zens. Disciplines, for their part, dealt with individuals and with increasing the 
useful capacities of their bodies in practical terms. This object of intervention 
of this technology of power is not society or the social body, as defi ned by the 
jurists; nor is it the individual-as-body, dealt with by disciplines. It is something 
different, a multiple body which is defi ned by the concept ‘population’ and 
which quickly became a research object of statistics and demography. Thus, 
biopolitics deals with the population as a political and scientifi c problem, as a 
biological problem and as power’s problem; an analytical object which exists 
in its own specifi c reality and which is governed by its own laws; or in other 
words, an analytical object which is in principle irreducible to the individual 
and the society and impossible to explain through the theory of sovereignty.
The second key precondition is not related to the actual historical appear-
ance of the ‘population’ element itself. It concerns the very essence, the very 
nature of the social phenomena that constitute the corpus of biopolitical knowl-
edge. For they are above all collective phenomena which have their economic 
and political effects and which become permanent only at the mass level of 
human beings. On the other hand, they are phenomena that are indeed aleatory 
and unpredictable when taken individually, but which, at the collective level, 
display common characteristics, constant quantities, isomorphous patterns that 
are possible to establish. They are, fi nally, phenomena that occur primarily over 
time and which have to be studied over a certain period of time; in sum, they 
are serial phenomena. Hence, biopolitics is directed precisely at aleatory events 
that occur within a population that exists over a period of time. Although these 
events are aleatory, they recur over time and form tendencies that can be pre-
dicted.
The third precondition is related to the specifi city of the means and tech-
niques of biopolitical intervention. The instruments of this technology of power 
have a certain number of functions that are very different from, even opposite 
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to, the functions of disciplinary practices. The mechanisms created by biopoli-
tics include, in the fi rst place, comprehensive forecasts, statistical estimates, 
and overall measures; their purpose is not just to modify a specifi c problem 
concerning the health or hygiene of a population, but to intervene at the level 
at which these general phenomena are determined, at the level of their general-
ity:
The mortality rate has to be modifi ed or lowered; life expectancy has to be 
increased; the birth rate has to be stimulated. And most important of all, 
regulatory mechanisms must be established to establish an equilibrium, 
maintain an average, establish a sort of homeostasis, and compensate for 
variations within this general population and its aleatory fi eld. In a word, 
security mechanisms have to be installed around the random element in-
herent in a population of living beings so as to optimize a state of life.
(Foucault, 2003, p.246)
Unlike disciplinary practices, these are overall mechanisms designed to 
achieve states of equilibrium, of balanced existence, of proportionality and reg-
ularity; in a word, to take control of the biological processes of man-as-species 
and to ensure that they are not disciplined, but regularized. This technology 
is centred not upon the body but upon life; it is a technology which brings 
together the mass effects characteristic of a population; which tries to control 
the series of random events that can occur in a living mass of human beings; 
a technology which tries to control and, possibly, to modify the probability of 
those events, or at least to compensate for their effects. This is a technology 
which aims to establish a homeostasis of the population by achieving an overall 
equilibrium, any deviations from which must be minimized; it aims to ensure 
the total security of the whole mass of human beings from internal dangers. In 
sum, it is a technology of drilling that is different from a technology of security; 
a disciplinary technology that is different from a regulatory technology; both 
technologies are technologies of the body, but one is a technology in which the 
body is individualized as an organism endowed with capacities, while the other 
is a technology in which bodies are replaced by general biological processes. 
Given these conditions, it becomes clear why and how a technical knowledge 
such as medicine would become a key element of enormous importance be-
cause of the link it establishes between scientifi c knowledge of biological and 
organic processes, that is, of the population and the body. On the other hand, 
we can see even in the late eighteenth century the fi rst manifestations, the fi rst 
efforts to transform medicine into a political technique for intervention with 
specifi c power effects; it is indisputable that within biopolitics, within its fi elds 
of social control, contemporary medicine is one of main regulatory technolo-
gies. Medicine is a power-knowledge that can be applied to both the body and 
the population, to both the functions of the organism and biological processes; 
180Critique & Humanism, vol. 35, special issue 2010
it therefore has both disciplinary effects and biopolitical effects.
But which is the one element that is the link between disciplinary and bio-
political power? The answer is almost self-evident: this is the Norm, under-
stood in three dimensions: as a minimal threshold, as an average, or as an op-
timum; the norm which carries in itself a potential for possible deviations. The 
discourse of biopolitics is therefore alien to that of the law; it is incompatible 
with the discourse that makes rules a legitimate product of the will of the sov-
ereign. The discourse of biopolitics and disciplines is a discourse about a rule: 
not a juridical rule derived from sovereignty, but a discourse about a natural 
rule, as is the norm. The norm is the element that constantly circulates between 
the disciplinary and the regulatory, and that can be applied in the same way to 
a body and to a population, irrespective of whether in the fi rst case the issue is 
rules of behaviour and social adaptivity, and in the second – statistical and de-
mographic indicators of the birth rate or the mortality rate. On the one hand, the 
norm is the element that makes it possible to control both the disciplinary order 
of the useful capacities of the body and the political order of the aleatory events 
that occur in the biological multiplicity. On the other hand, it makes it possible 
to identify all deviations; to distinguish minimal thresholds and regressions in 
development; to determine an average of equilibrium and of conformity; to 
postulate an optimum to be approximated; and, fi nally, to delineate the biggest 
difference of all, the external frontier from where starts the fi eld of ‘pathologi-
cal existence’. It is here that the technologies of discipline and the technologies 
of regulation intersect in the form of a coordinate system that covers the whole 
spectrum of the ‘deviant’, from the organic to the biological, from the body to 
the population. And that is why the most important political question of con-
temporary societies is not the question of the juridical existence of sovereignty, 
but that of the biological existence of the population.
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